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Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts
JACOBIEN RUTGERS
Since 1913, an Act of Congress has protected hogs, sheep and cattle against the marketing 
of worthless drugs. It is time, we gave men, women and children the same protection.1
J OHN F KENNEDY spoke these words on 15 March 1962 when he addressed the US Congress to announce his plans for consumer protection. Consumer policy, which is now laid down in Treaty on the Functioning of the EU (TFEU) 
Article 169, has not always been included in the Treaties governing the European 
Union. The Treaty establishing the Economic European Community of 1957 did not 
mention consumer policy. 2 Ten years after Kennedy’s speech to the US Congress, 
consumer policy was discussed at the Paris Summit in 1972.3 Nearly seven years 
later, the European Court of Justice (CJEU) mentioned consumer protection as one 
of the overriding mandatory requirements when the CJEU introduced the rule of 
reasons in Cassis de Dijon, which could justify an infringement of the free move-
ment of goods.4 In the Maastricht Treaty (1992), consumer policy was mentioned 
for the first time. However, already within the context of the internal market, 
the first consumer, product liability and doorstep selling Directives were adopted 
in 1985.5
Within this context, Directive 93/13/EC on unfair terms in consumer contracts 6 
(‘Unfair Terms Directive’) was adopted on 5 April 1993. It had to be implemented 
into the national legal systems of the Member States of the then European Economic 
Community by 21 December 1994. 
1 See jfklibrary.org/Asset-Viewer/Archives/JFKPOF-037-028.aspx.
2 See about the development of consumer policy in the European Union, S Weatherill, ‘Consumer 
Policy’ in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law (Oxford University Press, 2011) 837.
3 [1975] OJ C92/1.
4 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon) [1979] ECR 649.
5 Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions of the Member States concerning liability for defective products [1985] OJ 
L210/29; Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the consumer in respect of 
contracts negotiated away from business premises [1985] OJ L372/31. 
6 Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts [1993] OJ 
L95/29. For a comparative overview of the transposition of the Directive in French, German and English 
law, see H Beale et al (eds), Cases, Materials and Text on Contract Law, Ius Commune Casebooks for 
the Common Law of Europe, 2nd edn (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 780.
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It has been suggested7 that this Directive does not only concern unfair terms, but 
‘goes to the heart of contract law’. 8 In Océano, the CJEU handed down the first 
decision regarding this Directive, in 2000.9 This decision resulted in an essential 
change as to how the courts should deal with general conditions and the notion of 
avoidance in many Member States. This is just one example of the effect of the Unfair 
Terms Directive on contract law. The question which I will address in this chapter is 
whether this Directive has gone to the heart of contract law. To do so, I will discuss 
the case-law of the CJEU and try to place the cases in a broader perspective. 
As is well known, the Unfair Terms Directive aims at the protection of the 
consumer. This is stated in the recitals to the Directive and the CJEU referred to this 
repeatedly: 
the system of protection implemented by the Directive is based on the idea that the consumer 
is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as regards both his bargaining power 
and his level of knowledge.10
The Directive only applies to business to consumer (‘B2C’) contracts. The consumer 
is a natural person who acts outside his business, trade or profession, whereas the 
seller or supplier is a either a natural or a legal person who acts within his business, 
trade or profession (Unfair Terms Directive, article 2(b), (c)). Moreover, the Directive 
concerns minimum harmonisation. This implies that Member States are allowed to 
have more stringent rules to protect the consumer (article 8).11 According to the 
general scheme of the Directive, an unfair term in a B2C contract which is not 
individually negotiated, is not binding. However, contract terms that constitute the 
core of the contract do not have to pass the fairness test, provided they are in plain 
and intelligible language. The Directive gives general indications when a term is 
considered to be unfair. In addition, a term must be in plain and intelligible language 
(article 5). Hereafter, I will discuss in particular the recent case-law of the CJEU as 
to whether the Unfair Terms Directive goes to the heart of contract law. 
UNFAIR TERMS
Preliminary Remarks
To assess whether a contract term is unfair, it must first be established whether 
the challenged contract term falls within the scope of the Unfair Terms Directive, 
which concerns a non-individually negotiated term in a B2C contract (Unfair Terms 
  7 E Hondius, ‘The Reception of the Directive on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts by Member 
States’ (1995) ERPL 242.
 8 See also titles of books concerning this Directive: H Collins (ed), Standard Contract Terms in 
Europe: A Basis and a Challenge to European Contract Law (The Hague, Kluwer Law International, 
2008). See also in this respect H Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’ (1994) 14 OJLS 253.
 9 C-240/98–C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero; Salvat Editores SA 
v José M. Sánchez Alcón Prades, José Luis Copano Badillo, Mohammed Berroane, Emilio Viñas Feliú 
[2000] ECR I-4941. 
10 C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank Zrt v Csaba Csipai and Viktória Csipai, 21 February 2013 (CJEU, nyr).
11 See, eg also C-484/08 Caja de Ahorros y Monte de Piedad de Madrid v Asociación de Usuarios de 
Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc) [2010] ECR I-4785.
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Directive, art 3(1)).12 Moreover, the unfairness of a term that belongs to the core 
terms of the contract, provided that they are in plain and intelligible language, 
cannot be challenged (article 4(2)). The CJEU has held that this exemption does not 
apply in the case of mechanisms that amend/change the price of either the services 
or the goods.13 
Within English case-law and literature there is a discussion as to which terms 
belong to the core of the contract and how this must be established.14  I will not 
discuss English law, but I would like to address one element of that discussion. In 
this respect references are made to the average or typical consumer. It has been 
argued that, as to whether a term relating to the price of the service or the good is a 
core term of the contract, the term at stake must be considered through the eyes of 
the typical or average consumer.15 This was dismissed by Lord Mance in Office of 
Fair Trading v Abbey National, who held that this would not fit within the scheme 
of the Directive, since it introduced too complicated a test.16 
The notion of the average consumer is taken from European law. In this respect, 
Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices17  and the CJEU ruling in Gut 
Springenheide18 are mentioned. Whittacker argues that for the sake of uniformity 
in European law, the notion of the average consumer should be used.19 He refers 
to a number of CJEU decisions, but does not distinguish as to the subject matter 
of the case. Does it concern free movement or, for instance, is it a case concerning 
harmonisation of the labelling or marketing of eggs, which was the situation in Gut 
Springenheide.20 This notion, however, has also been criticised.21 Thus, opinions 
differ as to whether the consumer to be protected under the Unfair Terms Directive 
is the average consumer. Unberath and Johnston have pointed out that, in the case 
of consumer protection, the CJEU case-law has a double face.22  In their view, a 
distinction must be made between the case-law relating to the free movement of 
12 Cf Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’, n 2 above, 858; S Whittaker in H Beale (general ed), Chitty on the 
Law of Contracts, vol I, General Principles 31st edn (London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2012) para 15–053.
13 C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, 26 April 2012 (CJEU, nyr) 
para 23.
14 Offi ce of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6; Chitty on the Law of Contracts, 
n 12 above, para 15-033; S Whittaker, ‘Unfair Contract Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges’ (2011) 
74 MLR 114. Cf M Kenny, ‘The Law Commissions’ 2012 Issues Paper on Unfair Terms: Subverting the 
System of Europeanized Private Law’ (2013) ERPL 871.
15 Chitty on the Law of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15-033; Whittaker, ‘Unfair Contract Terms, Unfair 
Prices and Bank Charges’, n 14 above. See further in respect of the average consumer T Wilhelmsson, 
‘Cooperation and Competition regarding Standard Contract Terms in Consumer Contracts’ (2006) 
EBLR 52.
16 Offi ce of Fair Trading v Abbey National plc [2009] UKSC 6, para 102. Cf Beale et al, Cases, 
Materials and Text on Contract Law, n 6 above, 809.
17 Directive 2005/29/EC on unfair commercial practices [2005] OJ L149/22. 
18 C-210/96 Gut Springenheide GmbH and R Trusky v Oberkreisdirektor des Kreises Steinfurt and 
Amt für Lebensmittelüberwachung [1998] ECR I-4657.
19 Whittaker, ‘Unfair Contract Terms, Unfair Prices and Bank Charges’, n 14 above.
20 Chitty on the Law of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15-033; C-210/96 Gut Springenheide GmbH, 
n 18 above.
21 Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’, n 8 above; E Macdonald, ‘Bank Charges and the 
Core Exemption: Offi ce of Fair Trading v. Abbey National Plc’ (2008) 71 MLR 990. 
22 H Unberath and A Johnston, ‘The Double-headed Approach of the ECJ concerning Consumer 
Protection’ (2007) 44 CML Rev 1237. Cf H-W Micklitz et al (eds.), Cases, Materials and Text on 
Consumer Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2010) 38.
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goods and consumer protection, on the one hand, and the case-law relating to 
Directives harmonising consumer law, on the other.23 As to the free movement 
cases, a national rule can be challenged if it is contrary to the free movement of 
goods. Nevertheless, if an impediment to the free movement of goods is established, 
a national rule can be justified, inter alia, because of consumer protection, provided 
the other requirements of the rule of reason are also met.24 In these instances, only 
national rules which protect the confident, circumspect and well-informed consumer 
may justify an infringement; more protection for the consumer is dismissed by the 
CJEU. Many of these free movement cases concern national rules on advertising or 
marketing. 
In the case of positive integration, harmonisation of rules relating to consumer 
transactions, another type of consumer is protected, Unberath and Johnston have 
argued.25 Among those Directives, the Directive on unfair commercial practices26 
is the odd one out, because it provides explicitly that the consumer to be protected 
under that Directive is the average consumer. This notion has been taken from the 
case-law on free movement as regards advertising law.27 Taking into account the 
distinction between the two types of cases, as Unberath and Johnston have pointed 
out, it does not seem obvious that the notion of the average consumer should be 
used to determine the core terms of the contract.
Thus, if a term is not individually negotiated and does not belong to the core of 
the contract, a court can establish whether a term is unfair. 
Unfair
A term is ‘unfair if, contrary to the requirement of good faith, it causes a significant 
imbalance in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract to the detriment 
of the consumer’ (Unfair Terms Directive, article 3(1)). Assessing this significant 
imbalance contrary to good faith, ‘all the circumstances attending the conclusion 
of the contract and … all the other terms of the contract or of another contract 
on which it is dependent’ must be considered, as well as ‘the nature of the goods 
or services for which the contract was concluded’ (article 4(1)). From the CJEU 
case-law it can be inferred which circumstances must be considered. In Freiburger 
Kommunalbauten, the CJEU held that ‘the consequences of the term under the law 
applicable to the contract must also be taken into account. This requires that con-
sideration be given to national law’.28 The case concerned Mr and Mrs Hofstetter, 
who had bought a parking space in a car park which had still to be built. According 
to the contract, they had to pay the price before the building was finished and the 
builder had to provide them with a bank guarantee. They refused to pay the price, 
23 Unberath and Johnston, ‘The Double-headed Approach of the ECJ’, n 22 above.
24 ibid. Cf Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’, n 2 above, 842.
25 Unberath and Johnston, ‘The Double-headed Approach of the ECJ’, n 22 above.
26 See n 17 above.
27 Micklitz et al, Cases, Materials and Text on Consumer Law, n 22 above, 38.
28 C-237/02 Freiburger Kommunalbauten GmbH Baugesellschaft & Co KG v L Hofstetter and 
U Hofstetter [2004] ECR I-3403, para 21. Note by MW Hesselink, (2006) 2 ERCL 366; C-76/10 
Photovost’ SRO v Iveta Korcˇkovská [2010] ECR I-11557.
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whereas the builder had done what he had to do. The builder started proceedings 
against the couple and claimed payment of the price. Mr and Mrs Hofstetter argued 
that the clause according to which they had to pay the full price before the building 
was finished was unfair. Under German law, the clause was fair, because the builder 
had to provide a bank guarantee and had done that. 
In addition, the other circumstances to be considered are all the other terms of the 
contract29 and information included in a term which can be considered an unfair 
commercial practice.30 There is a list of clauses which could be considered unfair 
(article 3(3)). Thus, the test to be applied as to whether a clause is unfair is whether 
there is a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer contrary to good 
faith, considering all the circumstances during the conclusion of the contract and 
the other terms of the contract.31
Significant Imbalance Contrary to Good Faith
In Aziz, the CJEU discussed what pertains to a significant imbalance in the rights and 
obligations to the detriment of the consumer.32 In that case, Mohammed Aziz had 
borrowed EUR138,000 from a Catalan bank, Catalunyacaixa, to pay off another 
loan, which he had used to buy his family home in Spain. The loan was secured by 
a mortgage which was vested in the family home. At the moment he borrowed the 
money, 19 July 2007, Aziz had a monthly income of EUR1,341. Until 30 January 
2008, he had to pay a fixed amount of interest of EUR701.04. After that date, the 
interest was variable. From May 2008, Aziz failed to pay the monthly instalments. 
The general conditions of the loan agreement stipulated that if a debtor failed to 
pay, he had to pay an interest rate of 18.75 per cent. Aziz had accrued a debt of 
EUR139,764.76 when the bank started enforcement proceedings against Aziz to sell 
the house. In the end, the family home was sold for 50 per cent of its value and Aziz 
was forced to leave the house on 21 January 2011. In the meantime, Aziz had also 
started proceedings in which he asked for a declaratory judgment that clauses in his 
loan contract were unfair. Under Spanish procedural law, the enforcement proceed-
ings could not be deferred until a decision on whether the stipulations concerning 
the interest rate were unfair was given. 
To assess whether there is a significant imbalance to the detriment of the consumer, 
the CJEU held that a court must make a comparison between the situation where 
the contract was concluded and the situation where there is no contract.33 The latter 
refers to the situation where a court will apply the national rules as if there is no 
29 C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank Zrt v C Csipai and V Csipai, n 10 above, para 41. Chitty on the Law 
of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15-86.
30 C-453/10 J Perenicˇová and V Perenicˇ v SOS fi nanc spol SRO, 15 March 2012 (CJEU, nyr), Note 
by B Keirsblick, ‘The Interaction between Consumer Protection Rules on Unfair Contract Terms, and 
Unfair Commercial Practices: Perenicˇová and Perenicˇ’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 247; Chitty on the Law 
of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15-077.
31 See C-137/08 VB Pénzügy Lízing v F Schneider [2010] ECR I-10847.
32 Case C-415/11 M Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, Tarragona I Manresa (Catalunyacaixa), 
14 March 2013 (CJEU, nyr).
33 Consideration 68.
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contract. A court can then assess whether and to what extent the consumer will be 
in a worse position. If so, there is a significant imbalance. In a subsequent judg-
ment, Menéndez Álvarez, the CJEU observed that the assessment of a significant 
imbalance is not restricted to a quantitative economic evaluation.34 In that case, 
Menéndez Álvarez had bought a house. According to the sale contract, he was 
responsible for payment of an urban tax, which he paid, whereas it was the legislator’s 
intention that this tax should be borne by the seller. The question arose whether 
this clause was unfair, because the buyer had to pay a tax for which he was not 
liable. The CJEU considered that an impairment of the legal situation sufficed. The 
CJEU referred to three types of impairment: a restriction of rights; a constraint on 
the exercise of such rights; an imposition on the consumer of additional obligations. 
Apart from the significant imbalance, the contract term must also be contrary to 
good faith to qualify as unfair. In Aziz, the CJEU elaborated on this.35 The test to 
be applied is whether ‘the seller or supplier, dealing fairly and equitably with the 
consumer, could reasonably assume that the consumer would have agreed to such a 
term in individual contract negotiations’.36
Annex to Unfair Terms Directive
Another important element to assess as to whether a clause is unfair is the list 
provided in the Annex to the Unfair Terms Directive. According to article 3(3) of 
the Directive, these clauses may be considered unfair. The CJEU was asked repeat-
edly what the meaning of these terms are and in which situations they apply.37 In 
general, the CJEU held that inclusion of a term on the list is an essential element to 
assess whether a clause is unfair.38 In other words, inclusion is a strong indication 
that a term is unfair. Further, where necessary, the terms listed in the Annex must be 
interpreted in the light of articles 3 and 4 of the Directive.39 This line of reasoning 
of the CJEU seems to deviate from its ruling in Océano, where it held that a forum 
choice for the seller’s place of business was an unfair term, because these terms were 
included in paragraph 1(q) of the Annex.40
Apart from the general meaning of the Annex, the CJEU also discussed specific 
terms of the Annex. As already stated, in Océano, the CJEU held that a forum 
choice for the place of business of the seller fell within the scope of paragraph 
34 C-226/12 Constructora Principado SA v José Ignacio Menéndez Álvarez, 16 January 2014 (CJEU, 
nyr) para 24.
35 C-415/11 M Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, n 32 above, para 68.
36 ibid para 69. A different test seems to be proposed in Chitty on the Law of Contracts, n 12 above, 
para 15-074, where good faith is ‘to ensure that the test of “signifi cant imbalance” … is not applied in 
any sense mechanically’.
37 C-415/11 M Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, n 32 above, para 74.
38 C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, n 13 above; C-488/11 DF 
Asbeek Brusse and K de Man Garabito v Jahani BV, 30 May 2013 (CJEU, nyr) para 55. In an earlier 
decision, C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt v E Sustikné Györfi  [2009] ECR I-4713, para 43, the CJEU applied 
a more lenient test.
39 C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt v E Sustikné Györfi , n 38 above.
40 C-240/98–C-244/98 Océano Grupo Editorial SA v Roció Murciano Quintero, n 9 above.
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1(q) of the Annex and the CJEU itself held that it was an unfair term.41 This was 
nuanced in later decisions.42 In Pannon, also a forum choice for the place of the 
seller’s business was included.43 The forum was 275 km from the place where the 
buyer, who received an invalidity benefit, lived. Moreover, there was no direct train 
or bus connection, as a result it was very difficult for the consumer to reach the 
court chosen. The CJEU did not consider itself whether the clause was unfair, but 
held that it was for the national court to do so taking into account all the circum-
stances described above.44 
Another term listed in the Annex is the term according to which a consumer must 
pay a disproportionately high sum in compensation (paragraph 1(e)). In a num-
ber of cases, where especially Spanish courts had referred cases for a preliminary 
ruling, the CJEU considered paragraph 1(e) in connection with paragraph 1(g) and 
paragraph 2(a).45 One element of the tests which the CJEU explicitly referred to in 
connection with articles 3 and 4 is that the national court must compare the statu-
tory interest with the interest laid down in the contract. The CJEU applied the rule 
which it expressed as to the meaning of significant imbalance.
Another issue which the CJEU confirmed was that in long-term contracts, the 
supplier or seller has a legitimate interest to change the price unilaterally. If he does 
so, he must meet the requirements of transparency, balance and good faith. This 
all follows from paragraph 2(b) second sentence and (d) of the Annex.46 Crucial is 
whether ‘the reason for and the mode of a change of costs are specified in a trans-
parent way in the contract’, so that the consumer may expect the cost increases. 
Moreover, in the case of a price increase, the consumer must have the possibility of 
ending the contract. 
To sum up, from the case-law it follows that to assess whether a term is unfair, all 
the circumstances at the moment of conclusion of the contract are relevant, as well 
as the other terms of the contract. Moreover, to assess whether there is a significant 
imbalance to the detriment of the consumer, it does not suffice to assess whether 
the economic situation of the consumer is worse. Reference must also be made to 
the legal situation. To assess whether this is the case, a comparison must be made 
between the situation as if no contract had been concluded and the situation under 
the contract. In addition, under the case-law of the CJEU, the notion of good faith 
refers to the situation where a seller or supplier could reasonably expect a consumer 
to enter into a contract with those terms if the consumer had negotiated about 
the contract terms individually. The Annex (referred to in Unfair Terms Directive, 
41 ibid; Chitty on the Law of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15–106.
42 See, eg C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt v E Sustikné Györfi , n 38 above; C-137/08 VB Pénzügy Lízing v 
F Schneider, n 31 above.
43 C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt v E Sustikné Györfi , n 38 above.
44 It must be noted that arguably it follows from the holding in C-413/12 Asociación de Consumidores 
Independientes de Castilla y León v Anuntis Segundamano España, 5 December 2013 (CJEU, nyr), that 
in the case of consumer organisations, a forum choice for the habitual residence of the seller is permitted.
45 C-415/11 M Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, n 32 above, para 74; C-537/12 and C-116/13 
Banco Popular Español SA v Maria Teodolinda Rivas Quichimbo and Wilmar Edgar Cun Pérez; Banco 
de Valencia SA v J Valldeperas Tortosa and MÁ Miret Jaume, 14 November 2013 (CJEU, nyr).
46 C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, 21 March 2013 (CJEU, nyr).
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article 3(3)) is an essential element, together with those mentioned in articles 3 and 4, 
to establish whether a clause is unfair.
ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The Unfair Terms Directive provides that unfair contract terms are non-binding. In 
addition, article 5 of the Directive also provides that a term must be in plain and 
intelligible language. The Directive does not provide a remedy where a contract 
includes an incomprehensible term.47 It only provides the contra proferentem rule, 
which implies that in case of doubt the most favourable interpretation for the con-
sumer must be taken. 
Together with recital 20 of the Directive, the CJEU has also inferred from this 
provision that the information on contract terms must be available before the con-
clusion of the contract.48 This is ‘of fundamental importance to the consumer’.49 
In practice, this results in an obligations for the seller or supplier to provide the 
consumer with the contract terms before the conclusion of the contract, otherwise 
the consumer is not able to read the contract terms before entering into it. Thus, 
the CJEU presumes that the consumer reads the terms of the contract if they are 
provided to them before entering into the contract. The underlying idea is that the 
consumer understands the contract terms if he reads them before the conclusion of 
the contract and consequently he can take a well-informed decision about entering 
into the contract.50 Howeve r, this idea is questioned, because in daily life a consumer 
does not read general terms.51 A consumer does not read the general conditions before 
he buys a train ticket, because ‘[r]eading is boring, incomprehensible, alienating, 
time-consuming, but most of all pointless. We want the product, not the contract’,52 
as Ben-Sahar writes.
In this respect, the question is raised whether the duty to provide the information 
before the conclusion of the contract should not be abandoned, because it does 
not reflect empirical evidence and should be replaced by other means, for instance 
ranking of companies.53
Where the supplier or seller fails to provide the general conditions before the 
conclusion of the contract, the case-law does not indicate what the remedy should 
be, albeit, it is provided that it does not suffice to provide the information during 
the contract.
47 Collins, ‘Good Faith in European Contract Law’, n 8 above.
48 C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, n 13 above, para 27; 
C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, n 46 above; C-226/12 
Constructora Principado SA v JI Menéndez Álvarez, 16 January 2014 (CJEU, nyr) para 24.
49 C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, n 13 above, para 27; 
C-92/11 RWE Vertrieb AG v Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen eV, n 46 above; C-226/12 
Constructora Principado SA v JI Menéndez Álvarez, n 48 above, para 24.
50 Cf O Ben-Sahar, ‘The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract Law’ (2009) ERCL 1.
51 ibid; O Ben-Sahar and CE Schneider, ‘The Failure of Mandated Disclosure’ (2011) 159 University 
of Pennsylvania Law Review 647.
52 Ben-Sahar, ‘The Myth of the Opportunity to Read in Contract Law’, n 50 above.
53 O Bar-Gill and O Ben-Shahar, ‘Regulatory Techniques in Consumer Protection: A Critique of 
European Consumer Contract Law’ (2013) 50 CML Rev 119.
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UNFAIR CLAUSES: NON-BINDING
An unfair clause is non-binding (Unfair Terms Directive, article 6). This is a manda-
tory provision which aims ‘to replace the formal balance which the contract establishes 
between the rights and the obligations of the parties with an effective balance which 
re-establishes equality between them’.54 Non-binding is not a technical legal term. In 
some legal systems of the Member States, a distinction is made between nullity and 
avoidance. Non-binding means nullity rather than avoidance within the meaning 
of the Directive.55 Also,  other questions rise in this respect, for instance, whether 
a court may declare the whole contract non-binding if the consumer is better off 
that way. The CJEU held that this is not the legal consequence which the Directive 
attaches to an unfair clause, but since the Directive concerns minimum harmonisa-
tion, national legal systems can include that remedy in their legislation.56 
Another question is whether the non-bindingness of a clause in one particular case 
also has consequences for other cases. In Invitel, the CJEU said ‘no’.57 However, in 
a recent decision, Banco Popular Español, the CJEU explicitly referred to its previ-
ous decision in Aziz and its conclusion in that decision. In that sense, there is an 
informal way of dealing with precedents.58 The situation occurs most frequently 
when there are frequently used general conditions in a particular field. In practice, 
it is very likely that a court will follow an earlier decision, but it will result in costs 
for the litigating parties.
The notion of non-bindingness is not only important with respect to the remedy, 
but also concerns rules of civil procedural law. Now, I will deal with the latter 
consequences.
In Océano, the CJEU held, in answer to a preliminary question of a Spanish court, 
that a court has to apply the national rules transposing the rules laid down in the 
Unfair Terms Directive, by its own motion.59 The reasoning is that the Directive 
aims at the protection of the consumer vis-à-vis the supplier or the seller, because the 
consumer is in a weaker position than the creditor. To make sure that the consumer 
will have the protection he is entitled to under the Directive, a court must apply the 
rules of its own motion. A considerable number of preliminary questions, in which 
national courts sought guidance, followed Océano.60 The CJEU ruled in a similar 
vein. However, a few qualifications were made. To apply a rule of its own motion, a 
court must have sufficient factual and legal information.61 Moreover, a court cannot 
54 See, eg C-76/10 Photovost’ SRO v Iveta Korcˇkovská, n 28 above, para 38.
55 V Trstenjak, ‘Procedural Aspects of European Consumer Protection Law and the Case Law of the 
CJEU’ (2013) ERPL 459.
56 C-453/10 J Perenicˇová and V Perenicˇ v SOS fi nanc spol SRO, n 30 above.
57 C-472/10 Nemzeti Fogyasztóvédelmi Hatóság v Invitel Távközlési Zrt, n 13 above.
58 C-537/12 and C-116/13 Banco Popular Español SA v MT Rivas Quichimbo, n 45 above. 
59 Cf Chitty on the Law of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15–130; V Trstenjak and E Beysen, ‘European 
Consumer Protection Law: Curia Semper Dabit Remedium?’ (2011) 48 CML Rev 119; Trstenjak, 
‘Procedural Aspects of European Consumer Protection Law’, n 55 above; Weatherill, ‘Consumer Policy’, 
n 2 above, 859.
60 See, eg C-137/08 VB Pénzügy Lízing v F Schneider, n 31 above; C-76/10 Photovost’ SRO v Iveta 
Korcˇkovská, n 28 above.
61 Chitty on the Law of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15–131. 
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declare a term unfair if a consumer opposes this.62 In addition, a court must inform 
the parties that it will apply of its own motion the rules concerning unfair terms, 
and invite the parties to express their view on it.63 The CJEU referred in this respect 
to the right to a fair trial as laid down in Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights, which includes, amongst other things, the principle of audi alterem partem.
This is an effective way of preventing consumers being bound by unfair terms and 
the use of unfair terms by traders in contracts with consumers, the CJEU held.64 It 
also elaborated why the consumer does not raise the unfairness of the term. It could, 
for instance, be that the consumer is not aware of his rights or he does not appear 
in the proceedings because of the costs which those proceedings would involve.65
Whether a court must apply a rule of its own motion is generally considered to 
belong to the ambit of civil procedural law. This is not the only example of the 
way the Unfair Terms Directive affects national civil procedural law. If national 
rules of civil procedural law render the enforcement of consumer rights which 
stem from European law practically impossible, such national rules cannot be 
applied.66 To come to this conclusion, the CJEU has used the doctrine of effective 
judicial protection. It applies in situations where the matter at stake has not been 
harmonised (in the words of the CJEU: it is a matter for the Member States), but 
these national rules prevent or render the enforcement of rights to which a person 
is entitled under European law more difficult or even impossible. If that is the case, 
the national rule cannot be applied in that situation.67 To test whether the national 
rules render the enforcement of rights derived from European law more difficult, 
the CJEU uses the principles of effectiveness and equivalence.68 The latter refers to 
the situation where there is a similar rule under national law. In those instances, 
the European situation must be treated in the same way as the national one. If not, 
the national rules cannot be applied. This was at stake in Asbeek Brusse.69 Under 
Dutch civil procedural law, a court must apply rules of public policy even on appeal 
and even if the parties have not mentioned the issue in their complaints. However, 
on appeal a court is not allowed to raise issues which fall outside the complaints 
concerning the decision at first instance. The CJEU held that the rules laid down 
in the Unfair Terms Directive are comparable to rules which have a public policy 
character within the national legal system. As a consequence, since a court must 
apply national rules of a public policy character of its own motion on appeal, it 
62 C-243/08 Pannon GSM Zrt v E Sustikné Györfi , n 38 above.
63 C-472/11 Banif Plus Bank Zrt v C Csipai and V Csipai, n 10 above.
64 C-76/10 Photovost’ SRO v Iveta Korcˇkovská, n 28 above, para 41.
65 ibid para 43.
66 Chitty on the Law of Contracts, n 12 above, para 15–131; M Dougan, ‘The Vicissitudes of Life 
at the Coalface: Remedies and Procedures or Enforcing Union Law before the National Courts’ in 
P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd edn (Oxford University Press, 2011) ch 
14, 411. See, eg C-76/10 Photovost’ SRO v Iveta Korcˇkovská, n 28 above; C-413/12 Asociación de 
Consumidores Independientes de Castilla y León v Anuntis Segundamano España, n 44 above.
67 Cf Trstenjak and Beysen, ‘European Consumer Protection Law’, n 9 above, 96.
68 See, eg C-473/00 Cofi dis [2002] ECR I-10875; C-488/11 DF Asbeek Brusse and K de man Garabito v 
Jahani BV, n 38 above; C-537/12 Banco Popular Español SA v Maria Teodolinda Rivas Quichimbo, 
n 45 above; and C-116/13 Banco de Valencia SA v Joaquín Valldeperas Tortosa, n 45 above. Cf Trstenjak, 
‘Procedural Aspects of European Consumer Protection Law’, n 55 above.
69 C-488/11 DF Asbeek Brusse and K de Man Grabito v Jahani BV, n 38 above.
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should also apply rules of a European origin that have a public policy character, of 
its own motion. 
The principle of effectiveness applies when the national rule ‘makes the application 
of European Union law impossible or excessively difficult’.70 In Aziz, Spanish rules 
of civil procedure resulted in the impossibility of applying the rules included in the 
Directive, since it was not permitted to defer the enforcement proceedings relating to 
the mortgage until another judge had decided whether it concerned an unfair clause. 
Thus, the notion of non-bindingness does not only concern the remedy for an 
unfair term, but also affects national civil procedural law, as follows from the CJEU 
case-law. National rules which make it practically impossible to render an unfair 
clause not binding, cannot be applied under CJEU case-law.
CONCLUSION
The CJEU case-law on the Unfair Terms Directive deals with daily life situations: 
loan contracts which people enter into because they want to buy a car, a house; 
subscriptions to gyms; sale contracts to buy a parking lot or an encyclopaedia; rent 
contracts. By obliging the national court to apply of its own motion the rules in the 
Directive in so far as there are sufficient legal and factual grounds and, moreover, 
setting aside national rules according to which this is impossible, the CJEU has 
shown an activist side, which not only goes to the heart of contract law but also of 
other areas, for instance civil procedural law. In addition, in answer to preliminary 
questions, the CJEU has referred to the specific consequences in a particular case; 
for instance, in Aziz, Aziz was expelled from his home regardless of whether the 
terms were considered. Moreover, the CJEU has given guidance on how to interpret 
the notions of a significant imbalance and good faith. This all leads to the conclu-
sion that, because of the activist approach of the CJEU with respect to the Directive, 
the Unfair Terms Directive’s reach is beyond mere contract law.
Hugh, I first met within the framework of the Study Group on a European Civil 
Code. Hugh was one of the members of the drafting committee and I worked 
within the Amsterdam Team that drafted rules on commercial agency, franchising 
and distribution. Hugh came to the meetings we had with our advisers as a member 
of the drafting committee. Subsequently, Hugh invited me to work on the second 
edition of the Casebook on European Contract Law, together with Denis Tallon, 
Benedic te Fauvarque Cosson and Stefan Vogenauer. I have really fond memories of 
working together on the Casebook in Leamington and the other times we met. We 
not only discussed law but also, with Jane and Mark, the novels we had read and 
films we had seen. I hope that we will continue to do so. 
70 C-415/11 M Aziz v Caixa d’Estalvis de Catalunya, n 32 above; joined cases C-537/12 and C-116/13 
Banco Popular Español SA v Maria Teodolinda Rivas Quichimbo, n 45 above; and Banco de Valencia 
SA v Joaquín Valldeperas Tortosa, n 45 above.

